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THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK:
WHAT TO DO WHEN HEARSAY AND RULE 106
COMPLETENESS COLLIDE
Michael A. Hardin*
Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides that when one party in a trial or
hearing offers into evidence a portion of a statement in a misleading way,
the opposing party can offer the rest, or some other portion of, that
document or recorded statement at the same time if it is necessary for the
factfinder to understand and contextualize the first part. Sometimes,
however, the other portion, or “remainder,” would be inadmissible if it
were offered by itself, either because it is hearsay or for some other reason.
This leaves the court in a difficult position: Should it allow the remainder
to be entered into evidence in violation of some other rule that would
exclude it? Or should the court exclude the remainder and allow the initial
misleading portion to stand, uncorrected?
Some circuits have held that Rule 106 must trump the other rules of
evidence in order to do its job. These courts admit otherwise inadmissible
hearsay evidence for its truth. Other circuits have held that if no
independent hearsay exception exists for the remainder, it must be excluded
despite Rule 106. Finally, some opinions have suggested that Rule 106
allows the remainder of a statement to be admitted for the narrow purpose
of contextualizing the initial misleading portion.
This Note argues the following: if one party offers a misleading portion
of a statement into evidence, the opposing party should be able to offer the
remainder, but the jury should only be allowed to use it for context. The
evidentiary basis for doing so is not Rule 106, but rather the U.S. Supreme
Court case Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, which holds that remainders
necessary to correct misleading impressions are automatically relevant for
a nonhearsay purpose. The end of this Note offers courts a step-by-step
process for judges to follow when ruling on whether to admit remainders.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Columbia
University. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor James Kainen, for challenging me to
clarify my ideas, and my mother and father for teaching me the value of a good argument.
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INTRODUCTION
As Gerardo Lopez-Medina sat next to his attorney at the defense table, on
trial for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, his halfbrother’s ghost spoke out from the witness stand, and testified that the two
of them had possessed those drugs together.1 Lopez-Medina heard it, the
jury heard it, and in closing argument, it was not lost on the prosecutor, who
said that when the defendant’s “own half brother finger[ed] him,” it was
“the final nail in the coffin.”2 In reality, Rogelio Lopez-Ahumado, the
defendant’s half-brother, was sitting (very much alive) in a jail cell miles
away.
He had already pled guilty to possessing the very same
methamphetamine, stashed in the same truck, but had refused to testify for
either the government or the defense in his half-brother’s trial.3 As a
condition of his plea, Lopez-Ahumado had written a statement to the court
admitting that the truck, where the authorities had found the drugs,
belonged to Lopez-Medina, and that the drugs had belonged to both
brothers.4 The “ghost” was actually Officer Johnson, reading from the very
same statement that Lopez-Ahumado had to write before he could plead
guilty.5
However, the defendant (or rather his attorney) had a hand in summoning
this ghost. The defense strategy was to ask Officer Johnson whether LopezAhumado had already been arrested and had pled guilty to possessing the
drugs in question.6 When the officer affirmed Lopez-Ahumado’s arrest and
guilty plea, it was true, but it was not the entire story. So, the court allowed
the prosecution to have Officer Johnson read Lopez-Ahumado’s statement
implicating Lopez-Medina. The court permitted this reading to ensure that
the jury would not mistakenly believe that Lopez-Ahumado had admitted to
being the only person to whom those drugs belonged.7 From that point
forward, the prosecution was free to treat what Lopez-Ahumado wrote in
that statement as though he had said the words in open court.8
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, when one party offers a statement that
is misleading because it is incomplete, Rule 106, known as a version of the
“rule of completeness,” allows the other side to stop the proceedings and
“complete” the statement before any other evidence is presented.9 But what
happens when another rule of evidence renders the remainder of the
statement inadmissible? Does the court have the power to admit it anyway,
because completeness trumps one of the carefully crafted prohibitions on
what may be received in evidence? Should the court let the misleading

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 724–25 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 723–25.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 729.
FED. R. EVID. 106.
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statement stand and allow the jury to form the wrong idea about what was
said? Or can the judge fashion some kind of compromise?
The federal circuit courts continue to split on how to analyze and rule on
proposed completions of misleading statements under Rule 106.10 This
Note examines Rule 106’s role in the trial process, its relationship with the
other rules of evidence, and the different ways the courts have solved this
problem. Moreover, this Note provides courts with a step-by-step approach
to Rule 106 “completeness” problems as they arise at trial.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I serves as a primer, not only
on Rule 106, but also on hearsay, the rule of evidence that Rule 106 must
trump most often when it allows an out-of-court statement to be
completed.11 Part I also discusses various other rules of evidence that may
interact or conflict with Rule 106, as well as a U.S. Supreme Court case that
addressed a completeness issue without invoking Rule 106.12 Part II breaks
down the various analytical approaches that circuit and district courts have
taken to determine whether Rule 106 trumps other evidence rules. Finally,
Part III argues that while Rule 106 technically should not trump any other
rules of evidence, this does not mean that the remainder of a statement
cannot be admitted. Rather, if admitting the remainder of a partial
statement is necessary to avoid misleading the factfinder, the remainder will
almost never violate the rules of evidence in the first place: it will not be
hearsay, and it will serve a relevant purpose that does not prohibit its
admission.
I. THE COMPLETE PICTURE: RULE 106’S PLACE AMONG
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Part I.A covers relevant evidence rules, including jury instructions
limiting the purposes for which evidence is admitted. Part I.B introduces
the concept of “limited admissibility”—that is, the way evidence rules
distinguish between proper and improper purposes for which juries may
consider evidence. Part I.C covers the concept of hearsay, discussing
hearsay exceptions and exemptions, nonhearsay purposes of statements, and
some of the inherent asymmetries in who is allowed to offer statements into
evidence. Part I.D discusses Rule 106’s basic function and how to
determine if a remainder ought to be considered contemporaneously with
the portion of the statement initially offered into evidence.13

10. See infra Part II.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
12. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
13. For clarity, this Note will use the following terminology: “proponent” will mean the
party who initially offers a portion of the statement, document, or recording; “portion” will
mean the original part of a statement, document, or recording that the proponent offers;
“opponent” will mean the party against whom the portion is offered; and “remainder” will
mean the other part or parts of the statement that the opponent wishes to offer to complete
the portion.
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A. Basic Evidentiary Principles
This section introduces a few basic rules of evidence that inform the
discussion of other rules and evidentiary analysis in general.
1. Relevance and Rule 403
Rule 401 states that evidence is relevant if it tends to make any fact of
consequence more or less probable than that fact would be without such
evidence.14 Rule 402 states that relevant evidence is generally admissible,
except if admitting it would violate the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute,
the other Federal Rules of Evidence, or other Supreme Court rules.15 Rule
403 allows the judge to exclude relevant evidence on grounds of undue
prejudice, if the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed
by (among other things) its unfairly prejudicial effect or its ability to
mislead the jury.16 The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules defines
undue prejudice as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”17
2. Judges’ Control over Proceedings
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) gives the court “reasonable control over
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence.”18
This is so the court can make the examinations and presentations effective
for determining the truth, avoid wasting time, and protect witnesses from
being harassed or embarrassed on the witness stand.19 Some courts have
interpreted this rule to allow judges to apply Rule 106 to oral statements in
addition to writings or recordings.20
Rule 105 mandates that judges give proper jury instructions. It reads: “If
the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a
purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court,
on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly.”21 Many of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit
the use of evidence for one or more particular purposes but allow it for any
other purpose.22 For this reason, judges must tell the jury how to use a
piece of evidence in coming to a verdict.23 Limiting instructions may
prevent undue prejudice by cautioning the jury against using evidence the

14. FED. R. EVID. 401.
15. Id. R. 402. Compare id., with id. R. 106 (including no similar limitations on
admissibility).
16. Id. R. 403.
17. Id. R. 403 advisory committee’s note.
18. Id. R. 611(a).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. FED. R. EVID. 105.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 105.02[1]
(10th ed. 2011).
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wrong way.24 However, sometimes a jury instruction is insufficient,
because the risk of the jury misusing the evidence substantially outweighs
whatever probative value the evidence has when used correctly.25 In these
instances, the evidence will be inadmissible under Rule 403.26
When one party introduces a piece of evidence that is inadmissible for
one purpose but admissible for a different purpose, the opposing party has
the duty to object and request a limiting instruction from the judge.27 The
judge has no discretion to deny this limiting instruction.28 If the opposing
party does not object, the evidence may be used for any purpose.29
It is unclear how effective limiting instructions are at preventing juries
from using evidence for prohibited purposes. Jurors, uneducated in the law,
may struggle to understand the difference between the permitted and
prohibited purpose.30 Moreover, even if jurors understand the distinction,
they still might unconsciously draw a forbidden inference.31 On the other
hand, limiting instructions do constrain the attorneys. In closing arguments,
neither attorney may ask the jury to draw those forbidden inferences or
make an argument using the evidence for an improper purpose.32
B. “Limited Admissibility” and Exclusion of Evidence:
Relevant for the Right and Wrong Reasons
This section discusses the “limited admissibility” principle inherent in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and gives examples of rules embodying this
principle.
1. General Examples
Many Rules of Evidence are “purpose-specific”; they bar the use of a
certain kind of evidence for one particular purpose, but not other
purposes.33 This general principle has been called “limited admissibility.”34

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. § 105.02[4].
Id.
Id.
Id. § 105.02[2].
Id.
See id. (citing Gray v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 886 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1989)).
See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1235 (2007). But see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 59, at 259–60
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (“Realistically, the instruction may not always be
effective, but admission of the evidence with the limiting instruction is normally the best
reconciliation of the competing interests.”).
31. See Blinka, supra note 30, at 1235.
32. See id. at 1236.
33. 1 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 105.02[1].
34. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 59, at 259. The limited admissibility
approach is not without its critics. One criticism is that it allows for “lawyerly ‘mischief,’”
namely, that attorneys will use the existence of a single permissible purpose as a pretext to
admit evidence that they hope the jury will actually consider for its impermissible purposes.
See Blinka, supra note 30, at 1237–41.
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For example, under Rule 404(b), a party cannot use evidence of a
person’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts in order to prove that the person has a
certain character trait and acted in accordance with that trait on a particular
occasion.35 Policy concerns underlie this rule: evidence of a person’s
character “subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the
evidence in the case shows actually happened.”36 However, this kind of
evidence can be used for any other purpose besides proving that the person
acted in conformity with the character trait.37
Another policy-driven rule is Rule 407: if A gets injured, and
subsequently, B takes precautions that would have made A’s injury less
likely had those precautions been taken earlier, A cannot use those
subsequent precautions as evidence that B was at fault for A’s injury.38 A
major justification for this rule is that if our legal system admitted this
evidence to prove fault, it would punish people for fixing dangerous
situations.39 Accordingly, defendants would be deterred from fixing the
alleged cause of an injury for fear that the injured person would have a
stronger case against them.40 However, evidence of subsequent precautions
is admissible if offered for any other purpose.41
Some rules, however, are exclusionary rather than inclusionary. Instead
of allowing evidence for any purpose that is not improper, they bar certain
types of evidence outright, or admit evidence only if it is offered for a
specific, proper purpose.42 These rules may also be based in policy
considerations.43

35. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
36. Id. R. 404 advisory committee’s note (quoting 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N,
TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
615 (1964), available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub054.pdf).
37. Id. R. 404(b).
38. Id. R. 407.
39. See 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 407.02[2].
40. See id. For a criticism of this rationale, see id.
41. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (stating that, while evidence of an
offer to settle a claim cannot be used as evidence of the claim’s validity or amount, or for
impeachment purposes, because of a policy to promote settlement, it may be used for any
other purpose); id. R. 409 advisory committee’s note (stating that an offer to pay medical,
hospital, or similar expenses for an injury is not admissible to prove liability, so as not to
discourage people from making humane gestures); id. R. 411 (stating that, while having or
not having liability insurance cannot be used to prove or disprove negligence, so as to
prevent juries from deciding cases on improper grounds, it can be used for other purposes).
42. See, e.g., id. R. 412 (prohibiting the use of a victim’s sexual history or predisposition
and providing only limited and definite exceptions); id. R. 704(b) (unqualifiedly barring an
expert opinion as to whether or not a criminal defendant had a “mental state or condition that
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense”).
43. See, e.g., id. R. 412 advisory committee’s note (stating that the Rule protects alleged
victims from intrusions into privacy, embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping).
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2. Rules Governing the Use of Original Documents and Recordings
Several rules restrict witness testimony concerning the contents of
written documents and recordings. Rule 1001 says that a “‘writing’
consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any
form.”44 Similarly, a “‘recording’ consists of letters, words, numbers, or
their equivalent recorded in any manner.”45 Under Rule 1002, if a party
seeks to prove the content of a writing or recording, she must provide the
original, unless one of several exceptions is met.46 This does not mean that
if a statement was made and a writing or recording of that statement exists,
the party offering that statement must offer that writing or recording into
evidence in order to prove that the statement was made.47 Instead, it means
that if a party wants to use the writing or recording itself as proof of the
information it contains, the party must introduce the original48 or a
duplicate,49 rather than have a witness or other document simply summarize
or retell the information contained therein.50 However, not all testimony
about what a document or recording contains is for the purpose of proving
its content. For example, the rule may permit an expert witness to explain
how she relied on information contained in a document when coming to her
conclusion.51
In addition to the exception allowing duplicates,52 there are several other
exceptions to the requirement of originals. The proponent of a document or
recording can prove the content of a writing or recording without offering
the original if “all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the
proponent acting in bad faith,”53 if “an original cannot be obtained by any
available judicial process,”54 if the opponent controlled the original but
failed to produce it after notice that it “would be a subject of proof at the

44. Id. R. 1001(a).
45. Id. R. 1001(b).
46. Id. R. 1002. An original writing or recording “means the writing or recording itself
or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by the person who executed or issued it.”
Id. R. 1001(d).
47. 5 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 1002.02 [1].
48. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
49. Id. R. 1003. “A ‘duplicate’ means a counterpart produced by a mechanical,
photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately
reproduces the original.” Id. R. 1001(e). A duplicate may be used in lieu of an original
“unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances
make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Id. R. 1003.
50. 5 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 1002.02[1]; see R.R. Mgmt. Co. v. CFS La.
Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that affidavits and an
excerpted and redacted version of a written agreement were offered to prove the contents of
the agreement and thus were inadmissible under Rule 1002).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 566 F.3d 410, 412–14 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
an expert witness could testify to information he read in books and databases to come to his
conclusion about where certain guns were manufactured).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. FED. R. EVID. 1004(a).
54. Id. R. 1004(b).
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trial or hearing,”55 or if the writing or recording is “not closely related to a
controlling issue.”56 Furthermore, if an opposing party testifies or writes
about the contents of a document, Rule 1007 allows the proponent of the
document or recording to prove its content using the opponent’s testimony,
deposition, or writing; the proponent does not need to have the original.57
C. Primer on Hearsay: A Barrier with Many Gaps
This section discusses the definition of hearsay, the various exceptions
and exemptions to the rule prohibiting its admission, and ways that
statements may be admitted for a different purpose than to prove the truth
of the matters they assert.
1. Hearsay Defined
Hearsay is a statement, made outside of the current trial or hearing, that is
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.58 In other
words, hearsay is offered to prove that a fact asserted in the statement is
actually true. Hearsay generally is not admissible, except as provided by
Supreme Court rules, federal statute, or the Federal Rules of Evidence.59
Notably, a statement can be admissible despite the hearsay rule in three
distinct ways. First, a statement can be admitted pursuant to a hearsay
exception.60 Under Rule 803, a hearsay statement is admissible if
something about the statement indicates that it is sufficiently important and
reliable.61 For example, if the “declarant” (the person who makes the
statement) makes a statement to a medical doctor for the purposes of being
diagnosed or treated, this statement is excepted from hearsay because the
declarant has a strong motivation to be honest.62 A statement about a
startling event made by a declarant who still feels startled is excepted
because the declarant has little time to reflect and is less capable of
deception.63 Statements “describing or explaining an event or condition,
made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it” are considered
reliable for the same reason.64 Rule 803(3) excepts statements about the
declarant’s own state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition as
it exists at the moment the statement is made.65 The rules deem these

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. R. 1004(c).
Id. R. 1004(d).
Id. R. 1007.
Id. R. 801(a)–(c).
Id. R. 802.
See generally id. R. 803; id. R. 804.
4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 803.02[1].
FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note.
Id. R. 803(2) advisory committee’s note.
Id. R. 803(1) advisory committee’s note.
Id. R. 803(3).
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statements reliable because they are contemporaneous and based on one’s
own unique perception.66
Rule 804 provides additional hearsay exceptions for instances when the
declarant is unavailable.67 A declarant is deemed unavailable if she falls
into one of several delineated categories that preclude her from testifying.68
One hearsay exception conditioned upon unavailability is if the statement,
“when made, . . . had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil
or criminal liability” that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would have made [it] only if the person believed it to be true.”69
Second, a hearsay statement may be admitted under one of the Rule
801(d) hearsay exemptions,70 which are discussed below.71
Third, a statement may bypass the hearsay rule if it does not meet all the
criteria for hearsay.72 For example, because hearsay must be offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, if a statement is not offered into evidence for
the purpose of proving a fact that it asserts, it is not hearsay, and it may be
admissible.73 The statement must still be relevant74 and not substantially
more prejudicial than probative.75 To be relevant, the fact that the
statement was made must tend to prove or disprove something independent
of the truth of the statement itself.76 But offering a statement to prove
something other than its truth creates a risk that the jury may nevertheless
accept the statement as true.77 Therefore, for that statement to be
admissible under Rule 403, that particular risk must not substantially
outweigh the probative value of the nonhearsay purpose for which the
statement is offered.78
Of particular importance to this Note’s discussion of Rule 106 is the
potential not-for-truth use of statements to help the factfinder better

66. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 803.02[4][a].
67. See FED. R. EVID. 804.
68. See id. R. 804(a). For example, the declarant may be dead, see id. R. 804(a)(4), may
refuse to testify despite a court order, see id. R. 804(a)(2), or may be exempted from
testifying by privilege, see id. R. 804(a)(1).
69. Id. R. 804(b)(3)(A). This particular exception requires “corroborating circumstances
that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” Id. R. 804(b)(3)(B).
70. Id. R. 801(d). Hearsay “exemptions” are a different category than hearsay
“exceptions” under Rules 803 and 804.
71. See infra Part I.C.4.
72. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c).
73. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b]. Upon request, the judge must
instruct the jury to consider this evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered, not
as proof of the truth of the matter asserted. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
74. FED. R. EVID. 402.
75. Id. R. 403.
76. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b].
77. Id.
78. Id.; cf. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 98, 103–04 (1933) (holding that a
wife’s hearsay statement that her husband had poisoned her could not be restricted in
purpose to prove only that she wanted to live, rather than the truth of the matter asserted,
where “[t]he reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker
sounds”).
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understand a conversation, event, or the subsequent actions of a person who
heard the statement.79 In other words, a statement can be used not to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to provide “context.”
2. Nonhearsay Purpose: Statements Offered for Context
Parties may use a statement for many purposes other than to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. For example, in United States v. Colón-Díaz,80
the First Circuit found that it was not plain error to admit statements
suggesting that the defendant was the owner of a drug-selling location when
the statements were only offered for the context of a law enforcement
investigation.81 In that case, the district court properly admitted the
statements insofar as they explained why the investigators went to a
particular location and why some investigators gave certain directions to
each other.82 Moreover, each time such a statement was elicited, the judge
gave the requested instruction to the jurors that they were not to accept any
of the statements as proof that the defendant owned the location.83
But Rule 403 places limits on using such statements for this limited
purpose. In United States v. Johnson,84 the Second Circuit strongly
criticized the district court for admitting several statements only as context
to explain a subsequent investigation.85 In Johnson, the district court
allowed a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent to testify to
many incriminating statements from various informants (including drugpurchasing customers) that corroborated suspicions the DEA already had
about the defendant’s illegal activity.86 Although the Second Circuit upheld
the conviction because of overwhelming evidence of guilt,87 the court
scolded the prosecution for abusing “context” as a justification.88 In
particular, the agent should have explained that the DEA’s actions were
based on conversations with informants without disclosing the highly
prejudicial substance of those conversations.89
In this way, Rule 403 constrains nonhearsay use of prejudicial statements
for context.90 Often, though, the probative value of context increases when

79. See 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b].
80. 521 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 33–35.
83. Id.
84. 529 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2008).
85. Id. at 497–98.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 502.
88. See id. at 501–02.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 501 (“When the evidence is proper with respect to an unimportant issue but
improper and prejudicial on a crucially important issue, it is unlikely to pass the balancing
test of Rule 403.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048, 1050–52 (7th
Cir. 1998) (finding error in allowing an FBI agent to testify about an anonymous tip that the
defendant was the person who robbed a bank, because the testimony’s prejudicial value in
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it responds to an argument or suggestion that the opposing party has made;
this can tip the scales in favor of admitting the evidence.91
Another type of context is a “reciprocal and integrated utterance;”92 the
statement is offered not for the truth but to understand something said in
response. In United States v. Sorrentino,93 the court admitted a recorded
conversation between the defendant and a confidential informant, offered
by the prosecution.94 The court reasoned that the defendant’s statements
were not hearsay because they were statements by a party opponent under
Rule 801(d)(2)(a), and the informant’s statements were not hearsay because
they were only offered to make the conversation understandable.95
3. Nonhearsay Purpose: Explaining Expert Witness Testimony
Another nonhearsay use, not unlike “context,” is when a party wants to
elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence upon which an expert has relied in
forming her opinion. Under Rule 703, a court may allow testimony that
might otherwise be hearsay, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but
instead to help the jury understand and evaluate the expert’s opinion.96
However, unlike context, statements that are offered under Rule 703 must
pass a different balancing test than the one in Rule 403: their probative
value must substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect, rather than the
other way around.97 If the court admits this evidence, the judge, upon
request, must instruct the jury to consider it only to evaluate the expert’s
opinion, not as substantive evidence.98 Without this limitation, an expert
could testify to an inadmissible fact because it supported and explained her
opinion, and then on closing argument, the attorney could use that
testimony to argue that the same fact had been proven.99

implicating the defendant substantially outweighed the probative value of explaining the
investigation).
91. For example, in United States v. Gilliam, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it permitted testimony that, after leaving the crime scene, the police officer received an
anonymous tip about a second gun at that crime scene. United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97,
103–04 (2d Cir. 1993). The defendant had implied on cross-examination that the only
reason the officer returned to the scene was to harass the defendant and his friend. Id. This
increased the probative value of the fact that the anonymous tip was made (regardless of
whether or not it was true), because it tended to show that the officer went to the scene to
recover the gun, not to harass the defendant. See id.
92. United States v. Metcalf, 430 F.2d 1197, 1199 (8th Cir. 1970).
93. 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id.; see also United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 225 (1st Cir. 1995); United States
v. Beal, 940 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir. 1991).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data [underlying an opinion] would
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if
their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.”); 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 703.02[4].
97. FED. R. EVID. 703.
98. Id. R. 703 advisory committee’s note.
99. See Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 973 (2011).
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Limiting instructions in this context may be particularly hard for a jury to
understand.100 If an expert has testified that she credited this hearsay
evidence as true and used it to come to a conclusion, how can a juror use
that hearsay to evaluate the opinion without crediting it as true as well?101
Because of this difficulty, some commentators have argued that experts
should not disclose any inadmissible underlying data, while others have
said that all inadmissible underlying data should be received without
limiting instructions.102
However, the use of limiting instructions avoids the problems with either
of these extremes. As one commentator notes, without disclosing any
underlying data, two competing experts could testify that they consulted the
same data and came to opposite conclusions, and the jury would have to
choose one blindly over the other.103 But if a jury is allowed to consider
everything the expert says as substantive evidence, this gives the expert too
much power to decide what is relevant and even what is admissible.104
Thus, perhaps courts consider the use of limiting instructions the best of
flawed options.105 Notably, these instructions once again restrict the
attorneys’ ability to use the underlying data for an impermissible purpose,
that is, as proof of the truth of the matter asserted.106
The reverse balancing test was added when Rule 703 was amended in
2000, and reflects a policy consideration: it weighs heavily against using
experts as “conduits” for hearsay by having them simply repeat what they
have been told without relating it to their opinions.107 Again, these kinds of
statements can be prejudicial in the sense that a lay jury might use them as
proof of the truth of the matter asserted.108
4. Party Opponent and Other Asymmetries in Who Can Offer Statements
Under Various Rules
There are several rules of evidence that may allow one party to offer a
statement, document, or recording into evidence while the other party
cannot.109 The most obvious example is the party opponent exemption to

100. See supra Part I.A.2.
101. See Volek, supra note 99, at 973.
102. Compare Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39
VAND. L. REV. 577, 584–86 (1986) (arguing that experts should only be allowed to briefly
describe inadmissible documents upon which they have relied), with Paul R. Rice,
Inadmissible Evidence As a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor
Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987) (arguing that reliance by an expert should except
statements from hearsay).
103. See Volek, supra note 99, at 998.
104. See id. at 998–99.
105. See id. at 999.
106. See id. at 1000.
107. 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 703.02[4].
108. See id.
109. Professor Nance discusses at length these asymmetries and their interactions with
both Rule 106 and common law completeness. See Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal
Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825, 876–80 (1995) [hereinafter Nance, A Theory]
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hearsay. Under Rule 801(d)(2), a statement is not hearsay if offered against
the party who made the statement, even when used to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.110 Under this rule, however, the party who made that same
statement would not be allowed to offer it herself to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.111
This exemption to the hearsay rule is a product of the adversarial
system.112 Normally, hearsay is objectionable because the person who
made the statement is not testifying and cannot be cross-examined on the
reliability of that statement.113 But the opposing party cannot complain that
the speaker is untrustworthy, not present, or not subject to crossexamination when she herself is the one who made the statement.114
However, the same reasoning does not apply when a party, such as a
criminal defendant, offers her own out-of-court statements (usually through
someone else’s testimony) into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.115 The rule is concerned with preventing a party from making “an
end-run around the adversarial process by, in effect, testifying without
swearing an oath, facing cross-examination, or being subjected to first-hand
scrutiny by the jury.”116
An asymmetry could also arise if a criminal defendant testified at her first
trial but was retried for the same offense and chose not to testify a second
Rule 804(a) determines whether a witness is considered
time.117
unavailable for the purpose of applying the hearsay exceptions of Rule
804.118 Under Rule 804(a)(1), a defendant in this situation would be
unavailable to the prosecution because, as the defendant in a criminal trial,
she would be exempted from testifying if she chose not to.119 But because
not testifying is her choice, she would not be “unavailable” to herself as a
witness.120 Rule 804(b)(1) excepts certain kinds of prior testimony from
the hearsay rule, but only if the declarant is unavailable.121 Therefore, the

(discussing asymmetry created by hearsay rules as well as original document requirements);
Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51, 92–96 (1996) [hereinafter Nance, Federal Rules] (discussing
asymmetry in the admissibility requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
that would prevent an opponent from entering the remainder of a witness’s prior statement).
110. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Rule 801(d)(2) contains other rules that treat statements
made by others as though they were made by an opposing party. See id. R. 801(d)(2)(B)–(E).
111. Id. R. 801(d)(2)(A).
112. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[6][a].
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 801.02[6][c].
116. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2005).
117. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876.
118. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
119. Id. R. 804(a)(1); see Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876.
120. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876.
121. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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prosecution could offer the defendant’s prior testimony to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, but the defendant could not.122
Asymmetries like this are not limited to hearsay rules. For example, a
situation might arise concerning the rules governing original documents and
recordings123 in which a document is unavailable at trial because it is in the
possession of a third party.124 Party A could call Party B as an adverse
witness and question her about the document to prove its contents under
Rule 1007.125 But because Rule 1007 only allows a party to question the
opposing party about a document, after Party A’s attorneys finished, Party
B’s attorneys would not be able to question Party B any further to prove the
contents of that document unless they could produce the original.126
These asymmetries can create a Rule 106 problem. When one party is
allowed to offer a statement and the other is not, the first party might offer
an incomplete or misleading version of that statement. It is unclear whether
the opposing party is then able to offer the remainder in response.127
D. Rule 106: Finishing Each Other’s Sentences
This section discusses Rule 106’s stated purpose, the equivalent common
law “rule of completeness,” how Rule 106 functions in a proceeding, and
the scope of the “fairness test” that defines the kinds of statements to which
it applies. This section also summarizes the only Supreme Court case to
thoroughly address Rule 106 and the policy concerns underlying the Rule.
1. Completeness Purposes of Rule 106
Federal Rule of Evidence 106 reads: “If a party introduces all or part of a
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or
recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time.”128 According to the Advisory Committee notes, this rule has two
goals. First, it tries to prevent the “proponent” from selectively presenting
statements in a misleading way.129 It achieves this by allowing the
“opponent” to provide the context in which the original portion of the
statement should be understood.130 Second, it allows the opponent to
provide that context immediately, to reduce the risk that a jury will be

122. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876–77.
123. See supra Part I.B.2.
124. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78.
125. FED. R. EVID. 1007; see Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78.
126. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78.
127. For a discussion of this problem, see infra Part II.
128. FED. R. EVID. 106; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(6) (“If a party offers in evidence only
part of a deposition, an adverse party may require the offeror to introduce other parts that in
fairness should be considered with the part introduced, and any party may itself introduce
any other parts.”).
129. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
130. Id.
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prejudiced or misled if the remainder is not presented until later in the
trial.131
Rule 106, notably, does not contain a proviso stating that it may only
admit evidence subject to the other Federal Rules of Evidence.132 When
Rule 106 was drafted, the Justice Department requested a proviso be
inserted after “any other writing or recorded statement” that would have
read, “which is otherwise admissible or for which a proper foundation is
laid.”133 The Advisory Committee declined to adopt this proviso, claiming,
without explanation, that it was implicit in Rule 106.134 Even after
subsequent requests for clarification, the Advisory Committee did not take a
position on whether the rule would allow inadmissible evidence for the
purposes of completeness, but said only that the “fairness” test would be
sufficient to exclude inadmissible evidence.135
2. Rule 106’s Common Law Roots
Rule 106 is “an expression of the rule of completeness.”136 It has been
said that “[t]he rule of completeness, both at common law and as partially
codified in Rule 106, functions as a defensive shield against potentially
misleading evidence proffered by an opposing party.”137 The rule of
completeness is a common law doctrine that treats evidence and testimony
about statements differently than evidence and testimony about actions.138
Unlike a sequence of events, which can be broken down into individual
acts, the law has long recognized that a sequence of words often attempts to
express a single idea, one that a jury can only fully understand when it hears
all of the words.139 Common law verbal completeness is concerned both
with creating verbal precision and having all the parts of a statement.140
When a statement is incomplete, either because it is imprecise or because
part of it is missing, common law completeness distinguishes between
mandatory completeness (the evidence must be complete before it is
admissible at all) and optional completeness (the opponent may request
admission of the remainder).141 Of the two, optional completeness more

131. Id.
132. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
133. 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5071 (2d ed. 2005).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 5078.1. For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of Rule 106,
see Andrea N. Kochert, Note, The Admission of Hearsay Through Rule 106: And Now You
Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV. 499, 513–16 (2013).
136. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
137. Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th
Cir. 2001).
138. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2094 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., 1978).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. § 2095.
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closely resembles Rule 106, because the opponent is the party who wants to
admit the remainder.142
Optional verbal completeness uses a three-prong test to determine
whether the opposing party may enter the remainder of an incomplete
statement that has been admitted. The three prongs are as follows:
(a) No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable;
(b) No more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same
subject, and is explanatory of the first part, is receivable;
(c) The remainder thus received merely aids in the construction of the
utterance as a whole, and is not itself testimony.143

Prong (a) makes sure that the only remainders admitted are actually
relevant to understand the portion; if a remainder is irrelevant, it does not
matter that they are made at the same time or contained within the same
writing as the portion.144 Prong (b) has come to mean “the whole of what
was said at the same time on the same subject.”145 According to Wigmore,
prong (c) recognizes that the remainder would be hearsay if it asserted facts
or tended to prove the truth of the matter asserted.146 Instead, it can only be
admitted for a limited purpose: to help the factfinder interpret the portion
correctly.147 Wigmore gives the following example from the Bible: “There
is no God” is a misleading portion if the full statement is “[t]he fool hath
said in his heart, there is no God.”148 The remainder—“the fool hath said in
his heart”—does not have to be true; adding it to the beginning of the
statement need only clarify that this biblical passage does not deny the
existence of God. According to Wigmore, the remainder’s only permissible
purpose is to help the listener understand this point.149 However, prong (c)
has never been universally accepted,150 and one can see how the remainder
might be used as the speaker’s affirmation of a faith that only a fool would
deny.
When an opponent invokes common law verbal completeness, the
appropriate time to admit the remainder is during cross-examination of the

142. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 106 (“If a party introduces . . . a writing or recorded
statement, an adverse party may require [its] introduction . . . .” (emphasis added)). On the
other hand, only mandatory verbal completeness seems to require that the remainder be
admitted at the same time as the portion, since the evidence is admitted either in its entirety
or not at all. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2095.
143. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2113 (emphasis omitted); see People v. Schlessel, 90
N.E. 44, 45 (N.Y. 1909).
144. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2113.
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 105 So. 2d 691, 694 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that
the principle of verbal completeness “makes admissible self serving statements which
otherwise would be inadmissible”).
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proponent’s witness or else in the opponent’s case in chief.151 This usually
applies to oral statements because, at common law, writings were almost
always admitted in their entirety.152
3. How Rule 106 Functions in the Context of a Proceeding
Unlike common law completeness as described above, Rule 106 affects
the point in the trial at which the opponent can introduce a remainder.153 At
common law, in most cases the opponent would often have to wait until her
case in chief, or at least until cross-examination, before entering a
remainder into evidence.154 Rule 106 allows the party entering the
remainder to interrupt as soon as the portion is offered, whatever
examination is being conducted at the time.155 In this way, Rule 106
addresses the risk that the jury will be irreparably misled by the portion if
they are forced to wait for the remainder.156
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 106 clarify that, unlike at
common law, “[f]or practical reasons, the rule is limited to writings and
recorded statements and does not apply to conversations.”157 However,
many courts have found that Rule 611(a) gives the judge the same
discretion to apply the principles of Rule 106 to oral statements.158 Also, a
party may be able to use Rule 106 to enter a document or recording into
evidence, even if the proponent does not offer any portion of it directly, if
the proponent instead uses a substantial part of the written or recorded
statement to cross-examine a witness.159
Rule 106 does not exclude initially offered portions that are misleading.
Instead, it offers the opponent a chance to offer a remainder if necessary for
a fair interpretation.160 However, if there is no remainder available that
could correct the misleading impression, the court may exclude the portion

151. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2115.
152. Id. § 2116.
153. 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5072.1. One exception is when, in
mandatory common law completeness, the proponent must offer the entire statement at the
same time or else not offer any of it. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2095.
154. See 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5072.1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note. One such practical reason is that a
written or recorded statement has finite boundaries and can be “completed” simply by
reading the whole document or playing the whole recording, whereas defining the
boundaries of an oral statement is more difficult. See James P. Gillespie, Note, Federal Rule
of Evidence 106: A Proposal To Return to the Common Law Doctrine of Completeness, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 382, 388 (1987).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 620–21 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d
Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299,
313–14 (2d Cir. 1983). This Note takes no position on which is the correct view, but does
not exclude from consideration cases concerning oral statements if they are useful examples.
159. United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5078.
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under Rule 403.161 When an opponent wants to admit a remainder, the
burden is on the opponent to identify which portions of the statement are
necessary to qualify the portion that has already been admitted.162 Failure
to identify these portions at trial may prevent an appellant from asserting a
Rule 106 error on appeal.163 But, if the opponent fails to object under Rule
106 at the time the portion is offered, the rule does not preclude her from
trying to admit the remainder later in the trial, such as during crossexamination or in the opponent’s case in chief.164
4. Rule 106’s Scope: What Must Be Admitted in “Fairness”?
When a court decides whether to admit a remainder, it should not be
overinclusive or underinclusive. If a court does not admit a remainder, a
proponent’s incomplete portion could go unexplained and mislead the
jury.165 On the other hand, admitting all or too much of the remainder may
clutter the record or waste time if that remainder does not actually help the
jury understand the portion.166 The Supreme Court has not defined the
scope of Rule 106; in fact, it has only once discussed Rule 106 at length.167
However, circuit courts have articulated various tests to determine whether
a remainder “in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”168 For
the purposes of this Note, these tests will be called “fairness tests.”
For example, in United States v. McCorkle,169 the Seventh Circuit held
that the doctrine of verbal completeness does not extend to remainders that
are either (1) “irrelevant to the issue,” or (2) “more of the remainder . . .
than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the first part.”170
Meanwhile, several circuits have articulated positive fairness tests to
determine whether Rule 106 applies: the remainder must be “necessary to
(1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context,

161. Id.
162. United States v. Sweiss, 814 F.2d 1208, 1212 (7th Cir. 1987).
163. See id. at 1213.
164. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
165. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 56, at 248–52.
166. See id.
167. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988). The Court in Rainey declined
to decide the scope of Rule 106 by finding that the evidence had a nonhearsay use. Id. at
172–74.
168. FED. R. EVID. 106.
169. 511 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975).
170. Id. at 487. The court held that this test was not met when the defendant sought to
introduce a remainder of his admissions to IRS agents because none of his statements in the
remainder contradicted or explained the portion, namely, that the defendant failed to file his
tax returns on time. See id. at 486–87. This decision interprets the common law doctrine of
verbal completeness, rather than Rule 106. See id. at 486–87. The decision predates Rule
106. See Gillespie, supra note 157, at 384 n.24. However, many courts subsequently have
treated McCorkle as though its holding is applicable to Rule 106. Id.; see, e.g., United States
v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066,
1074 (5th Cir. 1983).
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(3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial
understanding.”171
5. The Fairness Test in Practice172
In practice, courts often—but not always—apply the fairness test first to
determine whether Rule 106 should apply at all before analyzing other
potential evidentiary problems with the remainder. Sometimes a remainder
is necessary to give meaning to a word in the portion. In United States v.
Perryman,173 the prosecution entered into evidence part of a transcript of
the defendant’s sworn statements when an attorney examined him regarding
an insurance claim.174 In one of the statements that the government
entered, the defendant agreed with the attorney that he “obviously didn’t
pay it.”175 The court found that an excerpt from one page earlier was
necessary for the jury to understand that “it” was a promissory note, and
held that the defendant should be allowed to enter this excerpt.176
Other times, the remainder may not be necessary to give meaning to a
word in the portion, but rather to dispel an improper inference the jury
might draw from the incomplete version of the statement. For example, in
United States v. Harper,177 the prosecution entered into evidence a part of
the defendant’s postarrest statement in which he stated that he would
probably be charged with possession of stolen property after the police
found guns in his house.178 The court allowed the defendant to offer the
remainder because it explained his prediction. His guns looked like hunting
guns, and because nobody in the house had a hunting license, the defendant
assumed the police would think he had stolen them.179 Presumably, the
remainder could rebut the inference that by predicting he would be charged
with possession of stolen property, the defendant was admitting that the
guns were stolen.180

171. United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v.
Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982)); see United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475
(7th Cir. 1992) (articulating a test weighing the same four factors but with an “and” instead
of an “or”); see also United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Rule 106 applies only to remainders that are relevant and necessary either to qualify, explain,
or contextualize the portion); United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he rule is violated only where admission of the statement in redacted form distorts its
meaning or excludes information substantially exculpatory of the declarant.”).
172. Because some courts subject oral statements to the same tests as written or recorded
statements, some of the following examples will be oral statements because they are able to
illustrate what passes the fairness test.
173. No. 11–CR–0100–CVE, 2012 WL 1664198 (N.D. Okla. May 11, 2012).
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
177. No. 05–CR–6068L, 2009 WL 140125 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009).
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id.
180. See id. at *7.

2013]

THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

1303

In United States v. Castro-Cabrera,181 the defendant was charged with
reentering the United States after being deported.182 During a previous
deportation hearing, the defendant was asked twice in a row to which
country he claimed citizenship; the first time, he answered, “Hopefully
United States through my mother,” while the second time, he answered, “I
guess Mexico until my mother files a petition.”183 After the government
offered only the second answer into evidence, the court found that the first
answer was admissible as a remainder because it gave a fairer
understanding of the defendant’s answer.184 Without the remainder, the
portion was a clear admission of Mexican citizenship, whereas both
answers together suggested that the defendant was unsure or thought he had
dual citizenship.185
In United States v. Haddad,186 the defendant admitted to the police that
he was aware of marijuana found under a bed, but not the gun that was
found inches away from it.187 The Seventh Circuit held that once the
prosecution elicited testimony that the defendant admitted knowing about
the marijuana, the defendant should have been allowed to elicit the part
about not knowing the gun was there.188 The court reasoned that the jury
might infer that because he knew about the hidden marijuana, the defendant
also knew about the gun right next to it.189 In contrast, another Seventh
Circuit case held that a defendant who admitted to smoking marijuana but
claimed not to know about crack cocaine hidden in the car was not allowed
to use Rule 106 to elicit the second part of this statement.190 The court
distinguished Haddad because merely admitting to smoking marijuana near
hidden crack cocaine did not imply that the defendant knew it was there the

181. 534 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
182. Id. at 1157.
183. Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 1160–61.
185. Id. at 1160.
186. 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 1993).
187. Id. at 1258.
188. Id. at 1259.
189. Id. Haddad’s reading of Rule 106 to dispel misleading inferences is probably too
broad. In Harper and Castro-Cabrera, the inferences concerned what the defendants’
incomplete statements meant. See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text. In Haddad,
however, the misleading inference was not that the defendant, by confessing he knew about
the drugs, was also confessing he knew about the gun. Instead, the “misleading” inference
was that because the defendant knew about the drugs, he also knew about the gun. See
Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259. In this sense, the incomplete statement to the effect of, “I know
about the drugs,” is not really a misleading statement because that statement does not confess
to knowing about the gun. It merely proves a fact—he knew about the drugs—that would
make it more likely he also knew about the gun right next to it, which he denied.
Determining the proper bounds of the fairness test is beyond the scope of this Note, but
understanding how broad some courts have made those bounds is helpful to understanding
the correct approach to admitting remainders. See infra Part III.
190. United States v. Doxy, 225 F. App’x 400, 402–03 (7th Cir. 2007).
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way that knowing about hidden marijuana right next to a hidden gun would
imply that Haddad knew that both objects were there.191
There are limits on using a remainder to dispel inferences. Generally, a
remainder under the fairness test has to be explanatory of the portion that it
completes, not just of the defendant’s theory of the case. In United States v.
Lewis,192 Defendant Billingsley, charged with firearm possession and
conspiracy to possess cocaine, could not elicit testimony from the agent
who interviewed him about how Billingsley never mentioned any of his codefendant’s criminal associates by name.193 The court found that although
this remainder could rebut the government’s theory about the level of the
defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy and explained the defendant’s
theory of the case in general, it did not contextualize any of the defendant’s
statements to which the agent had already testified. Accordingly, no
remainders were necessary.194
A remainder is often more likely to fail the fairness test when it was
made at a different time or on a different day than the portion. In United
States v. McAllister,195 the prosecution elicited testimony from the
defendant’s bankruptcy attorney that the defendant had made omissions in
his bankruptcy documentation.196 The court did not allow the defendant to
use Rule 106 to enter a recording from his bankruptcy hearing, partially
because the hearing took place weeks after the documents had been filed
and the government had not entered any portion of that hearing into
evidence.197 Likewise, in a mail and wire fraud conspiracy case, the
prosecution entered into evidence an instant message from the defendant
stating that he had work for the recipient if the recipient “abandon[ed his]
morals.”198 The defendant was not allowed under Rule 106 to submit text
messages from several weeks earlier that said he believed their operation
was not a scam, because the court found that it was too far removed in time
to be contextually related.199 However, not all remainders need to be from
the same conversation or the same day in order to pass the fairness test.200

191. Id.
192. 641 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2011).
193. Id. at 784–85.
194. Id. The court noted that the proper way to present this theory would be for the
defendant to take the stand and explain it, rather than depend on self-serving hearsay, and
that this method did not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by forcing him to
take the stand. Id. But see United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 85 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982)
(expressing concerns that excluding a remainder would unfairly force defendants to waive
their Fifth Amendment rights).
195. 693 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2012).
196. Id. at 585.
197. Id. at 584–85. The court also found that there was no contradiction between the
statements made in the portion and in the remainder. Id.
198. United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2011).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369–71 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding
that portions of a phone conversation ought in fairness to be admitted under Rule 106 after
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Finally, the simplest rationale for excluding an offered remainder under
the fairness test is that it does not explain the portion. For example, in
United States v. Gonzalez,201 the court found that the trial court did not err
in the following scenario: after the prosecution offered the defendant’s
postarrest statement in which he implicated his co-defendant as someone
who robbed drug dealers, the court prohibited the defendant from eliciting
the remainder, indicating that his brother kept him out of the drug
business.202 The court reasoned that there was nothing misleading about
the portion—that the co-defendant robbed drug dealers—in the absence of
the remainder, which was only self-serving hearsay.203 For similar reasons,
Rule 106 does not often apply to self-exculpatory statements and protests of
innocence that do not otherwise explain the portion.204
One scholar has attempted to categorize the various ways that a
remainder might be necessary to complete a portion, in an effort to identify
which of these categories do and do not fall within the scope of Rule 106 as
it has been applied by various courts.205 First, a remainder might change
the grammatical understanding of the portion.206 Second, a remainder
might directly reduce the probability that the portion is true.207 Third, a
remainder might undermine the credibility of the portion.208 Fourth, a
remainder might change or qualify the inference drawn from the portion.209
Finally, a remainder might raise a related but distinct factual inference than
the one that the portion raises.210 The scholar notes that the fourth and fifth
categories have the potential to be excluded because they are not
remainders in the most restrictive sense.211

the government offered into evidence several other phone conversations from different days
and with different speakers).
201. 399 F. App’x 641 (2d Cir. 2010).
202. Id. at 645.
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the portion of the defendant’s arrest video, in which he explains he was only present
with money to buy a truck, was not a necessary remainder under Rule 106 after the
government played the portion of the tape in which the defendant says there is money in his
shoebox).
205. Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 832–33.
206. Id. at 832 (portion: “Yes, I sawed him then”; remainder: “but I ain’t seen him later
that day”).
207. Id. at 832–33 (portion: “I killed him”; full statement: “I may have killed him”).
208. Id. (portion: “I killed him”; remainder: “as I would kill any invader from Mars”).
209. Id. (portion: “I shot right at him”; remainder: “but I missed”).
210. Id. (portion: “I killed him”; remainder: “in self-defense”).
211. See id. at 833.
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6. The Supreme Court Avoids Defining the Scope of Rule 106
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,212 the Supreme Court used relevance
principles to address the use of a remainder.213 Declining to decide whether
Rule 106 was implicated, a seven-justice majority held that “when one
party has made use of a portion of a document, such that misunderstanding
or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another portion,
the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore
admissible under Rules 401 and 402.”214 Importantly, the Supreme Court
resolved a completeness problem without resorting to Rule 106.
In Rainey, a product liability suit against an aircraft manufacturing
company for equipment malfunction, plaintiff Rainey was the widower of
one of the pilot-victims.215 The defense called Rainey as an adverse
witness, and questioned him about two statements he made in a letter
written several months after the fatal accident, which purported to give his
opinion as to the cause of the accident.216 The first such statement was that
his wife attempted to cancel the fatal flight because she was concerned
about her pilot student’s fatigue, and the second statement was that the
proximity of his wife’s plane to another plane may have caused one of his
wife’s crew to turn the plane suddenly to the right.217
On cross-examination, Rainey’s own attorney asked him whether that
same letter concluded that the cause of the accident was mechanical
malfunction and not pilot error.218 That was, in fact, Rainey’s conclusion in
the letter, but the trial court excluded his answer as an improper opinion.219
The Supreme Court held that exclusion of this answer was reversible
error because Rainey was not allowed to correct a misleading
impression.220 The defense’s questions may have given the impression that
Rainey’s letter attributed the crash to pilot error, when in fact the letter
explicitly attributed it to mechanical malfunction.221 The Court found that
the plaintiff should have been allowed to clarify this.222 The Court
reasoned that such testimony was not an improper opinion because the
plaintiff only offered it to rebut the defense’s implication that Rainey had
since changed his mind about the cause of the accident because of the
lawsuit.223 Talking about the portion of the letter in which Rainey

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

488 U.S. 153 (1988).
Id. at 172.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 172–73.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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explicitly attributed the crash to mechanical failure was the only way to
counteract that impression.224
Furthermore, even though the defense had not objected to Rainey’s letter
on hearsay grounds, the Court found that the statement was not hearsay.225
The Court explained that the statement was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted but rather “to prove what Rainey had said about the accident
six months after it happened, and to contribute to a fuller understanding of
the material the defense had already placed in evidence.”226 Thus, the
Court concluded that a correct understanding of the hearsay rule would not
bar Rainey from offering this remainder.227
II. COMPLETE CHAOS: THE CIRCUITS SPLIT ON
ADMISSIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY
The circuit courts have been split for decades over whether Rule 106
allows into evidence a remainder that would otherwise be inadmissible, for
hearsay reasons or otherwise.228 Even today, circuit and district court
opinions acknowledge this split, but do not try to resolve it.229 Nor does the
Supreme Court seem likely to resolve it, since the only Supreme Court case
to discuss Rule 106 declined to use the rule to decide the case.230
The simplest way to express this circuit split is as a yes or no question: If
the remainder of a statement “in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time”231 as the portion offered by the proponent,232 must it nevertheless be
excluded or limited if it violates a different rule of evidence, such as
hearsay? Or, does Rule 106 allow a remainder to trump rules of evidence
that would otherwise exclude or limit it?
But this split is a bit more complicated than answering these questions
with a “yes” or “no.” On the one hand, United States v. Sutton233 represents
the school of thought that Rule 106 was specifically designed so that it
would not be subject to any of the other rules of evidence.234 On the other
hand, many courts insist that Rule 106 should be subject to all the other

224. See id.
225. Id. at 173 n.18.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Compare United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Rule 106
can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise
inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be
considered contemporaneously.”), with United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th
Cir. 1996) (“Rule 106 . . . would not render admissible the evidence which is otherwise
inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Other circuits
have held differently, but we adhere to our own precedent.” (citation omitted)).
230. See Rainey, 488 U.S. at 172.
231. FED. R. EVID. 106.
232. The tests for determining whether the remainder meets this requirement are
discussed above. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
233. 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
234. Id. at 1368.
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rules of evidence. These courts typically do so in dicta, because they also
find that the remainder fails the fairness test.235
United States v. LeFevour represents the middle-ground interpretation.236
In LeFevour, Judge Posner suggested in dicta that if an otherwise
inadmissible remainder is necessary to correct a misleading impression, two
solutions exist: either the remainder becomes admissible for the limited
purpose of correcting the misleading impression, or else the portion must be
excluded if a consideration such as privilege renders the remainder
inadmissible.237 This section of the Note considers these three possibilities
and their implications.
A. The United States v. Sutton Approach:
The Remainder Is Admissible
At least seven circuits have held at various times that if a remainder
passes the fairness test, no other rule of evidence should exclude it from
being entered under Rule 106. These include the D.C.,238 First,239
Second,240 Third,241 Fourth,242 Seventh,243 and Tenth Circuits.244
First, in Sutton, the D.C. Circuit noted that Rule 106 is contained in the
section of the rules that broadly governs the more familiar rules of
admissibility.245 The court also explained that, unlike the other “major
rule[s] of exclusion,”246 Rule 106 has no proviso subjecting it to any other
rules.247 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it should be construed
broadly, reasoning that the drafters would have known to write it more
narrowly had it been intended to be subject to the other rules.248

235. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008). In cases like
this, the remainders never fell within the scope of Rule 106 in the first place, because they
would not pass the “in fairness” standard. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
236. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986).
237. Id. at 981.
238. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
239. See United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
Awon, 135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998).
240. See United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007).
241. See United States v. Green, 694 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d
312 (3d Cir. 1989).
242. See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988).
243. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986). In this case,
however, the court qualified the admissibility of the evidence, allowing it only for the limited
purpose of avoiding a misunderstanding of the portion. See id.
244. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2010).
245. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
246. See id. at 1368 & n.16 (citing FED. R. EVID. 402, 501, 602, 613(b), 704, 802, 806,
901(b)(10), 1002).
247. An example of this kind of proviso is found in each of the cited rules. See supra note
246. For instance, Rule 402 subjects the admissibility of relevant evidence to exceptions
provided by “the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court.” FED. R. EVID. 402.
248. See Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368.
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Moreover, the court considered Rule 106’s legislative history, stating that
it showed that the drafters considered and rejected a proviso subjecting Rule
106 to the other rules of evidence.249 The court found, therefore, that any
evidence necessary to contextualize the portion should be admitted, subject
only to common law relevance.250
As applied to Sutton’s specific facts, once the prosecution admitted
portions of phone conversations between the defendant and his former coconspirator that tended to show consciousness of guilt, the defendant should
have been allowed to enter other portions of another phone conversation
with the same person, separate in time, to counter that inference, despite
that conversation otherwise being inadmissible hearsay.251
More recently, in United States v. Lopez-Medina,252 the Tenth Circuit
relied on Sutton’s reasoning when it allowed the prosecution to admit
otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony from the defendant’s half-brother
under Rule 106.253 The way this case used Sutton’s Rule 106 approach was
particularly expansive.254 The government offered Lopez-Ahumado a
sentence reduction in exchange for his cooperation, but Lopez-Ahumado
refused to testify against Lopez-Medina or anyone else.255 Prior to trial, the
defense proffered evidence that the half-brother had pled guilty to establish

249. See id. at 1368 n.17.
250. Id. at 1369.
251. Id. at 1366–69. Defendant Sucher was convicted of various bribery- and conspiracyrelated charges when he sold information and confidential documents from the Department
of Energy to defendant Sutton through several intermediaries. Id. at 1348–49. The
government introduced several recorded phone conversations between Sucher and one of the
intermediaries, Peacock (who was secretly cooperating with the investigation), tending to
show Sucher’s consciousness of guilt, because they tended to show he was afraid that two of
the other intermediaries were going to turn him in. Id. at 1366–67. At trial, Sucher sought to
introduce a portion of the recording of yet another conversation with Peacock, which
occurred close in time to the ones introduced by the government, but the government
objected on hearsay grounds. Id. at 1367. The trial court wrongly (according to the circuit
court) excluded four portions of the conversation, all of which were Sucher’s statements. Id.
Each statement tended to clarify that he had not known he was doing anything illegal when
he gave the documents to one of the intermediaries. Id. Sucher claimed that the statements
would show he was not afraid that the intermediaries would truthfully report his role, but
rather that he was afraid they would falsely implicate him. Id. at 1368. The trial court
rejected this argument. Id.
As a side note, to the extent that the statements offered as remainders showed Sucher
was afraid of being falsely implicated at the time he made them, see id., they probably could
have been admitted independently of Rule 106 as statements of his then-existing state of
mind. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
252. 596 F.3d 716 (10th Cir. 2010). For the narrative of this case, see supra notes 1–8
and accompanying text.
253. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735–36.
254. The Tenth Circuit in Lopez-Medina declined to decide the case on other potential
grounds, namely, whether the defendant waived his Confrontation Clause rights by
questioning Officer Johnson about Lopez-Ahumado’s plea, because the court found Rule
106 to be sufficient grounds to justify the admission of this testimony despite the
Confrontation Clause. See id. at 734–35. The Confrontation Clause and how it may interact
with Rule 106 is beyond the scope of this Note.
255. Id. at 723.
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that Lopez-Ahumado had possessed the drugs by himself.256 The
prosecution initially objected to the plea as inadmissible hearsay, but
eventually agreed to its admission so long as the factual allocution
implicating Lopez-Medina could be admitted as well.257 The defense
acknowledged that the factual allocution could be admitted if the defense
sought to enter the plea.258 The judge tentatively agreed.259
During trial, defense counsel cross-examined an officer about the halfbrother pleading guilty to possession of the drugs.260 The judge then
allowed the prosecution to enter the factual allocution of the plea into
evidence.261 Defense counsel did not object but sought to enter the entire
plea agreement, which showed that the government had offered LopezAhumado a sentence reduction in exchange for cooperation.262 The trial
court refused to receive that part of the agreement.263
In closing argument, the prosecutor used Lopez-Ahumado’s factual
allocution as affirmative evidence of the defendant’s guilt, arguing that the
drugs in the truck belonged to the defendant just like Lopez-Ahumado
stated in his plea.264 After the prosecutor argued that “the final nail in the
coffin for [Lopez-Medina] was his half-brother’s admission under oath in
court,” and remarked that “his own half brother [sic] fingers him,”265
defense counsel posed a rhetorical question in response. He asked, “Why
did he implicate his brother? I didn’t get a chance to go there with you.
You saw the evidence, all of you. Use your common sense. Read what’s
there. People make deals in this business.”266
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Rule 106 made the factual allocution
admissible.267 Using a positive fairness test similar to that described
above,268 the court found that the plea allocution was necessary to correct
the misleading impression that Lopez-Ahumado possessed the drugs by
himself.269 The court agreed with Sutton that Rule 106 allows otherwise
inadmissible evidence to be entered because it is not subject to the other
rules of evidence.270

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 729.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 734.
See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735.
Id. at 735–36.
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B. The “Remainder Is Not Admissible” Approach
At least five circuits have at times endorsed the opposite proposition to
the Sutton approach, holding that a remainder must otherwise be admissible
or else be excluded. These include the Second,271 Fourth,272 Sixth,273
Seventh,274 and Ninth Circuits.275 Almost all of these decisions seem to
support the proposition in dicta,276 but more recently, a case in the Sixth
Circuit based its exclusion of a remainder solely on the understanding that
Rule 106 does not make hearsay admissible.277
In United States v. Terry,278 the Second Circuit held that (1) Rule 106 did
not apply to oral statements and (2) even if it did apply, the rule could not
make the defendants’ self-serving hearsay statements admissible.279 A
prosecution witness testified that the defendants refused to have their palm
prints taken, but the trial court would not allow the defendants to enter the
remainder of their statement under Rule 106: that they would not give palm
prints until they had spoken with their lawyers.280 The Second Circuit
found no error in this interpretation of Rule 106.281 However, the court
held that the statement should have been admitted under Rule 803(3), the
state of mind exception.282
In United States v. Wilkerson,283 the Fourth Circuit held Rule 106
inapplicable when a defendant sought to enter part of his own statement in a
conversation.284 The court reasoned that Rule 106 did not make
inadmissible evidence admissible, but also held the rule inapplicable
because the defendant’s statement was oral and because no part of the

271. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Rule 106 does
not render admissible evidence that is otherwise inadmissible.”).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven if, as
Wilkerson claims, Rule 106 had applied to this testimony, it would not render admissible the
evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule
covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that
should be excluded.”).
274. See United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] party cannot
use the doctrine of completeness to circumvent Rule 803’s [sic] exclusion of hearsay
testimony.” (citation omitted)).
275. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing
that Rule 106 “does not render” otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible), with United
States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the rule “‘does not compel
admission’” (quoting Phx. Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1995))).
276. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 64–66.
277. See United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826–27 (6th Cir. 2013); see also infra
notes 291–306 and accompanying text.
278. 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1983).
279. Id. at 313–14.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. The remainder was evidence of the defendants’ then-existing state of mind
insofar as their statement was to the effect of, “we intend to refuse giving palm prints until
we speak with our lawyers first.” See id. at 314.
283. 84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1996).
284. Id. at 696.
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conversation that the defendant wanted to quote had been offered into
evidence.285
More recently, in United States v. Crosgrove,286 the Sixth Circuit recited
a blanket rule that Rule 106 does not make hearsay admissible.287 The
circuit court then reasoned that the defendant’s desired remainder, an
instant message sent weeks before the portions (also instant messages) were
ever sent, was too far removed in time to clarify anything about the
portions.288
A particular pattern emerges in these cases. Courts of this view often
state that Rule 106 cannot render inadmissible remainders admissible, but
then go on to find other reasons not to admit the remainder: the remainder
may fail the fairness test,289 or may be an oral statement,290 rendering Rule
106 inapplicable depending on the jurisdiction. Thus, the statement itself
that Rule 106 does not trump the other rules is usually dicta.
Research does not uncover a case in which a court explicitly found that a
remainder passed the fairness test and yet excluded it as hearsay. Recently,
though, in United States v. Adams,291 the Sixth Circuit strongly intimated
that the prosecution’s presentation of a recording was unfair within the
meaning of Rule 106, but adhered to precedent by upholding the trial
court’s exclusion of the remainder.292
In Adams, defendant Maricle, a state court judge, was accused of
conspiring to buy votes and to help appoint corrupt members of the Clay
County Board of Elections, among other things.293 The government was
allowed to present portions of a phone recording in which two cooperating
witnesses told Maricle about questions they had been asked during their
grand jury testimony.294 Cooperator Kennon relayed that he had been
asked whether Kennon had used Maricle’s influence to procure votes for a
particular candidate.295 Maricle responded by asking, “Did you promise
anybody I’d do anything for them?” to which Kennon responded, “Only
one was that Downy boy; Bobby Downy’s brother.”296 Maricle was not
allowed to present his very next response, “‘That’s one thing I did very
seldom, promised to do, I never promised anybody that I would help
somebody in a Court case . . . I don’t believe having cases held over head

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See id.
637 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 661.
See id. at 661.
See id.
See Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 696.
722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013).
See id.
Id. at 799–800.
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 826–27.
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forever for some political thing.’”297 Moreover, later in the same recording,
Maricle denied knowing anything about the “Downy boy.”298
Then the government presented another recording in which cooperator
White told Maricle that she had been asked at grand jury whether Maricle
had appointed her as an election officer.299 Maricle responded, “Did I
appoint you? (Laugh),” and White said “Yeah.”300 Once again, Maricle
was not allowed to present the next thing he said, “‘I don’t really have any
authority to appoint anybody.’”301
The defense argued that these omissions changed the meaning of the
defendant’s statements.302 Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that “these
examples highlight[ed] the government’s unfair presentation of the
evidence,”303 it adhered to its precedent in United States v. Costner, holding
that Rule 106 “‘is not designed to make something admissible that should
be excluded.’”304 The court noted that such a rule “leaves defendants
without redress” for unfair presentation,305 and suggested that the Sixth
Circuit revisit its interpretation of Rule 106 en banc.306
Sometimes, courts that would require a hearsay exception to admit a
remainder under Rule 106 will find that no exception exists even before
analyzing the remainder under the fairness test. In United States v.
Vargas,307 the Seventh Circuit found that Rule 106 did not allow a
defendant to show another part of his arrest video (a portion of which had
already been shown) because there was no hearsay exception for his
statement that he was there buying a truck.308 The court never decided
whether the remainder, the statement about the truck, passed the fairness
test as necessary to explain the defendant’s statement in the portion: that
the defendant had money in his shoebox.309 Likewise, in United States v.
Fisher,310 a district court in Michigan held that Rule 106 did not apply to
the defendant’s offered remainder because there was no applicable hearsay
exception, and only then commented that even if there were a hearsay
exception, the remainder was not sufficiently related to the portion to pass
the fairness test.311 Conducting the analysis in this order suggests that even
if the remainder had passed the fairness test, it still may have been excluded

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 826 (quoting United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 827.
Id. at 826 n.31.
689 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 876.
See id. at 870, 876.
No. 06-CR-20415-2, 2008 WL 2605405 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2008).
Id. at *1.
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because there was no hearsay exception.312 Finally, in United States v.
Whaley,313 the district court said in dicta that “[a]rguably, the redacted
version of the statement distorts its meaning,” but found that Rule 106
would not permit the defendant to offer the redacted portions into evidence
because they were his own out-of-court hearsay statements.314
On the other hand, in United States v. McDarrah,315 the Southern District
of New York held that a remainder’s value in understanding the portion was
an acceptable nonhearsay purpose.316 The law enforcement agent had taken
notes and written a summary of his postarrest interrogation of the
defendant.317 On direct examination, the agent did not testify about the
contents of those notes or the summary.318 On cross-examination, the
defense attorney asked repeatedly about how some of the defendant’s
statements to which the agent had just testified were missing from the
summary, and how the statements in the summary purported to be the
agent’s words, not the defendant’s.319 The agent stated several times that
the summary of the interview was not comprehensive and that he had
paraphrased, but the defense attorney continued to cross-examine him on
the subject.320 Finally, the judge allowed the prosecution to enter the report
under Rule 106 (even though the rule does not allow hearsay to be
admitted) because it would be the best available way to clarify for the jury
whether the agent’s testimony was credible or not.321
These cases demonstrate that this approach has a few subdivisions:
although all agree that hearsay is not admissible under Rule 106, some
courts will end the analysis once they determine there is no hearsay
exception and bypass the fairness test altogether,322 while others perform
the fairness analysis first and recognize that a necessary remainder may not
be hearsay at all.323
C. A Middle Ground: United States v. LeFevour
United States v. LeFevour,324 a prosecution of a corrupt former state
court judge,325 represents a middle ground between the most permissive and
most restrictive approaches to remainder admissibility.

312. See id. at *1.
313. No. 3:10–CR–169, 2011 WL 3843699 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2011).
314. Id. at *7.
315. No. 05 Cr. 1182(PAC), 2007 WL 273799 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007).
316. Id. at *10.
317. Id. at *1.
318. Id. at *2–3.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at *10; see also Greener v. Cadle Co., 298 B.R. 82, 91–92 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(holding that two additional business documents that were necessary for context were not
hearsay at all when offered for that purpose).
322. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 315–21 and accompanying text.
324. 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986).
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In LeFevour, the prosecution offered the recording of an entire
conversation between the defendant and a cooperating traffic court officer
who helped the defendant take bribes.326 The recorded conversation tended
to show that the defendant knew who the witness had retained as a
lawyer.327 The defense tried unsuccessfully to enter the remainder of the
recording, in which the cooperating witness told an FBI agent that he did
his best to scare the defendant into talking during the conversation they had
just had; the defendant was not on this part of the recording.328 Ultimately,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of this remainder
because it was not necessary to correct a misleading impression.329
In his opinion for the LeFevour panel, Judge Posner set forth a different
Rule 106 formulation. On the one hand, he criticized the opinion in
Costner330 for describing Rule 106 as only regulating order of proof, that is,
for suggesting that Rule 106’s only purpose is to force the presentation of
the remainder immediately, rather than later in the trial.331 Judge Posner
stated that Rule 106 also allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence.332
However, Judge Posner qualified this by saying that when otherwise
inadmissible evidence is entered through Rule 106, it is for the limited
purpose of correcting what would be a misleading impression.333 He went
on to say that, “if [the remainder] is inadmissible (maybe because of
privilege), the misleading evidence must be excluded too.”334 Judge Posner
reasoned that an opponent seeking to admit a remainder should only be
concerned with “pulling the sting from evidence [the proponent] wanted to
use against him.”335 Either excluding the entire statement, or admitting the
remainder only to correct the misleading impression, would be enough to
neutralize the portion without “overrid[ing] every privilege and other
exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal armamentarium.”336
Despite articulating a test, LeFevour is very infrequently cited as
authority on Rule 106. Research does not disclose a case that applies

325. Id. at 979.
326. Id. at 980–81.
327. Id. at 981.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 981, 985.
330. 684 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1982).
331. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. Judge Posner’s “pulling the sting” rationale has been criticized as too narrow.
See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 98 (arguing that the proponent of an
incomplete statement runs the risk that the jury may use the remainder “to reach a conclusion
more favorable to the opponent than it would have reached if neither part were introduced”).
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LeFevour to admit a remainder for the limited purpose of correcting a
misleading impression.337
III. COMPLETELY BLINDSIDED: RAINEY, NOT
RULE 106, GOVERNS ADMISSIBILITY
Does Rule 106 allow a remainder that has passed the fairness test to be
admitted into evidence despite being inadmissible under a different rule?
This turns out to be a trick question. If a remainder is truly necessary to
understand a misleading portion, then, as the Supreme Court makes clear in
Rainey, it is ipso facto relevant for the limited nonhearsay purpose of
providing context or dispelling the misleading impression that the jury
might get without it.338 So, if a remainder passes the “necessary” test in
Rainey, it becomes admissible for “context” regardless of Rule 106, not
because of it.339
This Part first discusses the theory of limited admissibility for remainders
articulated in Rainey and inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Next,
it discusses the role of Rule 106, and why using Rule 106 to trump other
rules of evidence is both unnecessary and undesirable. Third, it describes
the confusion created by the proposition that Rule 106 does not make
inadmissible evidence admissible, and explains the methodological
problems both of that approach and Judge Posner’s approach. Fourth, this
Part suggests steps a judge should take to decide a Rule 106 objection.
A. No Further than Needed: Toward a Limited Admissibility
Approach to Necessary Remainders
Rainey’s theory of remainder admissibility is just another example of the
limited admissibility approach that the Federal Rules of Evidence embody
in general.340 In most cases, determinations of admissibility are driven by
the purpose for which the evidence is used, not by some artificial category

337. In the few instances where LeFevour has been cited in a case with an arguably
inadmissible remainder, the remainder did not pass the fairness test to fall within the scope
of Rule 106. See United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1018–20 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that self-serving hearsay did not come in under Rule 106 because the remainder was a
conversation with a different person and not contextually related to the proponent’s offered
portion); United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 943–44 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that asking a few questions on cross-examination about a document summarizing the
government’s case theory did not effectively enter a portion of the document into evidence
so as to allow the prosecution to offer the rest as a remainder); United States v. Vargas, No.
08 CR 630, 2011 WL 116826, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) (holding that a defendant who
made inculpatory statements in a conversation—offered by the prosecution in its entirety—
was not entitled to offer exculpatory statements from a later conversation).
338. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also Donald F. Paine, The Rule of
Completeness, 38 TENN. B.J. 31, 31 (2002) (“The best approach is to handle the problem
with an instruction to the jury. If the contextual statement is otherwise inadmissible hearsay,
the judge should instruct the jury to consider it only as affecting the weight given the original
statement.”).
339. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
340. See supra Part I.B.
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into which the evidence falls. Evidence of a prior bad act is not inherently
inadmissible; it is only inadmissible if used to show bad character.341 An
out-of-court statement is hearsay only if its purpose is to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, and not merely that the words were said.342 Testimony
about a document is inadmissible only if that testimony is offered to “prove
the content” of that document.343
In all of these cases, however, the same evidence is admissible if it can be
used for a purpose other than the prohibited one. Of course, evidence must
always be relevant, and cannot be more prejudicial than probative: unlike
many rules, Rules 401, 402, and 403 are not subject to limited admissibility
analysis.344 On the other hand, when a rule bars the admission of certain
kinds of evidence without regard to its purpose, or does so subject only to
limited exceptions, this expresses a preference for excluding this kind of
evidence that is stronger than normal.345
Rainey stays true to these concepts. Though it is improper to admit an
out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted (absent an
exception), it is proper to admit the same statement for a not-for-truth
purpose, so long as that use is relevant.346 Rainey declares remainders ipso
facto relevant for “context” when they are “necessary.”347 If limited in this
way, as Rainey makes clear, we need not worry about the hearsay rule,
because providing context or dispelling misleading impressions is not the
same as using the remainder to prove the truth of the matter asserted.348
Of course, just as with any other application of limited admissibility
analysis, a “necessary” remainder offered for “context” should be excluded
if it is substantially more prejudicial than probative, in the sense that no
limiting instruction could prevent the jury from using the remainder for the
prohibited purpose.349 Yet, if a remainder is necessary to avoid a
misunderstanding, especially one that the proponent created by offering
misleading evidence, the probative value of a necessary remainder will
often be weighty enough to pass the Rule 403 balancing test.350

341. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. It would not make sense to say, for
example, that irrelevant evidence is admissible if it is offered for a different purpose than the
one for which it is irrelevant. Nor, for that matter, would it make sense to say that evidence
that is substantially more prejudicial than probative is still admissible for a different purpose,
because “undue prejudice” is defined as using evidence for an impermissible reason. See
supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 42.
346. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. Gilliam provides a good analogy:
when the defense tried to mislead the jury by making it look like the officer’s reason for
returning to the scene was to harass the defendant, rather than to respond to the anonymous
phone call about the second gun, the probative value of admitting the statement about the
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Consider the following example: in a personal injury suit, immediately
after the injury occurs, the plaintiff says to the defendant, “Oh, by the way,
when I testify against you next week in your assault trial, I’m going to lie in
court to make you pay for assaulting my brother last year.” At trial, the
defendant testifies that the plaintiff said, “I’m going to lie in court.” The
plaintiff seeks to elicit the entire statement, either by cross-examining the
defendant, or testifying in rebuttal, but the defendant objects both on
grounds that it is hearsay351 and that it is evidence of the defendant’s prior
bad act.352 The plaintiff can argue that the remainder is necessary for
context, to dispel the misleading impression that the plaintiff was talking
about the present lawsuit. This solves both the hearsay problem and the
Rule 404(b) problem: a necessary remainder is not hearsay,353 and the
evidence is not being offered to prove that the defendant is a violent person,
but rather so that the jury can understand what was said.354
Admittedly, it is a bit harder to justify using “context” as a permissible
purpose to get around the restrictions of the original document rule.
Consider the problem discussed above: under Rule 1007, the proponent
questions the opponent about an unavailable document that has been the
subject of previous testimony or writing by the opponent, in order to prove
a misleading portion of its contents.355 The opponent is barred by Rule
1002 from testifying to prove the remainder of the document on redirect
examination.356 Under Rainey, the remainder is both relevant and
nonhearsay,357 but Rule 1002 prohibits testimony to prove the content of
the document without the original.358
Research does not disclose a case (applying Rule 106 or otherwise) in
which this particular problem arises. The best solution, however, is to draw
an analogy between using a “context” statement not to prove the truth of the
matter asserted359 and using it not to prove the content of the document.360
The remainder of the document would be offered, not to prove the content

gun for “context” increased. See United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103–04 (2d Cir.
1993); supra note 91 and accompanying text. Of course, if a portion is so misleading that a
remainder is necessary, but the misleading impression it creates is not particularly damaging,
while the remainder is highly prejudicial, the court would be right to exclude the remainder.
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
351. The defendant would have offered this statement under the party-opponent
exemption because the plaintiff is the party-opponent, but the plaintiff is not the partyopponent to herself, and thus could not offer her own statements under this exemption. See
supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 214, 225–26 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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of the remainder but only to clarify the content of the portion by providing
context.361
The Rainey understanding of remainder admissibility also squares well
with the asymmetrical aspects of the Federal Rules of Evidence.362 Just as
limiting admissibility based on the purpose of the evidence reflects policy
concerns,363 so too does limiting admissibility based on who is offering
it.364 For example, the reason defendants are barred from admitting their
own exculpatory hearsay statements is so that they cannot, in effect, testify
without being cross-examined.365 But when a proponent takes advantage of
an asymmetry to offer a misleading portion, knowing that the rule is
unavailable to the opponent, the limited admissibility approach strikes the
correct balance. On the one hand, it prevents the proponent from offering
evidence that cannot be rebutted. On the other hand, it respects the policy
reasons behind those asymmetries by keeping the opponent from using
remainders for any purpose but “context.” This prevents the opponent from
overriding the rules by offering the remainder as substantive proof.366
Finally, the Rainey approach has at least some support in the common
law. Although common law roots are never absolutely uniform, the threepronged test that Wigmore recognized resembles this approach in the sense
that the first two prongs resemble various versions of the Rule 106 fairness
test,367 and the third prong similarly limits the remainder’s purpose to
interpreting the portion.368
But can we really say that a remainder that would otherwise be hearsay is
offered for some other reason than to prove the truth of the matter asserted?
To use one of Nance’s examples, “I shot right at him, but I missed,”369 it
seems strange to say that “but I missed” could clarify “I shot right at him”
without being accepted as true. It can be even less clear when the words of
the portion are not misleading but give rise to a misleading impression.
Using Lopez-Medina as another example, it is strange to think that the
inference to the effect of, “those are my drugs and mine alone” could be

361. Smith provides another good analogy in the expert witness context: the court found
that testifying to the contents of documents to explain expert conclusions was not the same
as testifying to prove the content of those documents. See United States v. Smith, 566 F.3d
410, 412–14 (4th Cir. 2009); supra note 51 and accompanying text. For further discussion
of the analogies between nonhearsay use under Rule 703 and for “context” of necessary
remainders, see infra notes 371–77 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part I.C.4.
363. See supra Part I.B.
364. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
366. Rainey’s holding that a necessary remainder is not hearsay solves all of the
asymmetries of the hearsay rule. See supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of how this theory of remainder admissibility solves the asymmetries of the
original document rule, see supra notes 355–61 and accompanying text.
367. Compare supra note 143 and accompanying text, with supra notes 170–71 and
accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
369. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 832.
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given any clarification without accepting the gist of the remainder, “those
drugs belong to both my brother and myself” as true.370
This is somewhat similar to the difficulty of instructing jurors on how to
use otherwise inadmissible facts and data to evaluate expert testimony.371
But this analogy also offers a solution: when we say that a statement is not
hearsay, we do not mean that the jury cannot evaluate whether the statement
is true, but only that they may not use it as affirmative proof of that truth.
After all, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.372 Therefore, the jury in Lopez-Medina could have
been instructed that they could consider whether the statement to the effect
of, “those drugs belong to both my brother and myself” would dispel the
inference that Lopez-Ahumado had said that the drugs were his alone,373
but not as independent evidence tending to prove that Lopez-Medina
possessed the drugs.374 This may be a razor-thin distinction, but it remains
valuable because it constrains the attorneys, as well.375 The prosecutor in
Lopez-Medina would not have been allowed to argue, essentially, “we
know the defendant is guilty because his brother says so.”376 There is
certainly value in preventing attorneys from telling the jury to use evidence
incorrectly. And, just as in the Rule 703 context, admitting the remainder
as nonhearsay and giving limiting instructions is a better option than either
trumping all other rules of evidence or leaving the jury completely in the
dark.377
More generally, though, the Rainey approach resembles other legitimate,
similar nonhearsay uses. In Sorrentino, the statements of the person talking
to the defendant became admissible for context because the conversation

370. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
372. FED. R. EVID. 801 (emphasis added).
373. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
374. See Paine, supra note 338, at 31. In fact, it is possible to analyze each of Nance’s
categories in this way. See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. In category I, “but I
ain’t seen him later that day” does not prove that the declarant did not see the person, but
only that when the declarant said “I sawed him then,” “sawed” does not mean “to cut with a
saw.” See supra note 206 and accompanying text. In category II, the remainder, “may
have,” is not affirmative proof that the declarant “may have” killed someone, but rather it
shows that the statement, “I killed him” is not certain. See supra note 207 and accompanying
text. In category III, the remainder, “as I would kill any invader from Mars,” need not prove
the declarant’s steadfastly violent patriotism for Earth, but need only qualify the inference
that “I killed him” is a credible confession. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. In
category IV, “but I missed” may be credited as true for the purposes of dispelling the
inference that “I shot right at him” means “I shot him,” but not as independent evidence that
the speaker missed, were such proof relevant for some reason. See supra note 209 and
accompanying text. Finally, in category V, the remainder “in self-defense” could be used to
counter the inference that “I killed him” was an unqualified confession, but not as
affirmative proof that the declarant did kill in self-defense. Thus, if the declarant had the
burden to prove self-defense, this statement could not be used to meet that burden and the
judge should instruct the jury accordingly. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
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would be unintelligible without it,378 not unlike an incomplete portion. Or
sometimes, like in United States v. Gilliam, where the defense painted a
misleading portrait of a police officer’s motivations, context becomes more
relevant when it can dispel incorrect inferences, again, not unlike a
remainder.379 It should not be a particularly controversial idea that when a
statement provides “context” or helps a jury understand the underpinnings
of something important, it is probably relevant for some reason besides
proving the truth of the matter asserted.
In short, the purpose of a Rainey remainder is not to act as affirmative
proof, but only to negate any incorrect inference that would necessarily
arise from leaving the portion incomplete. The remainder cannot prove
what it says; it can only show the jury that the portion does not mean what
the proponent says it means.
B. Unnecessary Trumping: Why Rule 106 Need Not
Wipe Out the Other Rules
Where does Rule 106 come into play in all of this? For any “necessary”
remainder within the meaning of Rainey, Rule 401 and Rule 402 do all of
the work to make it admissible.380 But is that enough for Rule 106 to
accomplish its purpose?381
It should be. The reason it is so difficult to draw the distinction between
Rule 106 and the ipso facto relevance of necessary remainders in Rainey is
because the tests are very similar. If a remainder passes the Rule 106
fairness test, it must be necessary to understand the portion.382 If that
remainder is necessary to understand the portion, it is ipso facto relevant
under Rainey.383 If it is relevant under Rainey, then, per Rainey, it also has
a legitimate nonhearsay purpose.384 Therefore, any statement that passes
the fairness test of Rule 106 is ipso facto relevant and has a legitimate
nonhearsay use: to clarify the portion or dispel any improper inference it
suggests.
Put simply, if a remainder passes the fairness test of Rule 106,385 it will
pass Rainey’s “necessary” test386 and be admissible. Conversely, if a
remainder is not necessary under Rainey, it will not pass the fairness test of
Rule 106, and Rule 106 should not apply at all.
What, then, is Rule 106’s purpose? The answer is written right into the
language of the rule: it allows the opponent to interrupt the proponent as

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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soon as a misleading portion has been offered.387 This was not part of the
common law388 and it is not something that the Rainey rule can accomplish
by itself.389 In addition, particularly in cases where the remainder is
admissible independent of Rainey, like a remainder that falls into a hearsay
exception,390 Rule 106’s fairness test391 still applies to determine whether
the remainder must be presented immediately, or if it can wait until a later
point in the trial.392
What about using Rule 106 to make the remainder admissible for some
purpose other than “context” or dispelling misleading inferences, as in
Sutton and Lopez-Medina?393 If it is true, as this Note argues,394 that the
“context” purpose for which a remainder is admitted under Rainey is
sufficient to clarify the portion, then Rule 106 need not go any further than
that.395 To interpret Rule 106 otherwise is to ignore the value of limited
admissibility evident in the federal rules without accomplishing anything
that Rule 106 sets out to do. Though these cases may correctly admit the
remainder, they incorrectly allow use of that remainder without restriction,
or as substantive evidence of what the remainder asserts.
The Advisory Committee clearly states two goals for Rule 106:
correcting misleading impressions created by a lack of context, and
preventing the harmful effect of delaying that correction to a later point in
the trial.396 The ability of the rule to interrupt testimony addresses this
second concern; it ensures that the remainder can be offered immediately,
so that the jury is not left with a misleading impression for so long that it
cannot be corrected.397 It follows, then, that the fairness test addresses the
first purpose, by defining what remainders are “necessary” to correct those
misleading impressions.398
If a remainder is relevant under Rainey and admitted for the limited
purpose of correcting a misleading impression, then it has already

387. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
389. Perhaps Rule 611(a), which controls order of proof, would allow a judge the
discretion to admit the remainder as soon as the portion is offered, see supra notes 19–20
and accompanying text, but Rule 106 insists upon it more forcefully and is more explicit. See
supra notes 153–56.
390. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
392. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
393. See supra Part II.A.
394. See supra Part III.A.
395. Other commentators have found differently. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note
109, at 96 (“[T]he remainder should be admissible for any purpose as to which the original
incomplete part is admissible and as to which the former qualifies or explains the latter.”);
Kochert, supra note 135, at 517–18, 527 (endorsing Judge Posner’s view in LeFevour).
396. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 173–204 and accompanying text.
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accomplished Rule 106’s stated purpose.399 The misleading impression has
been countered because the opponent has used the remainder to show why
the initial portion might not mean what the proponent wants the jury to
think it means.
In a case like Lopez-Medina, the remainder might be devastating to the
proponent’s misleading inference: the defendant’s attorney wanted the jury
to believe that the defendant’s brother had taken sole responsibility for
possessing the drugs, yet the brother’s complete statement flatly
contradicted that inference, crippling the credibility of that argument.400
That is enough to accomplish Rule 106’s stated purpose. Although using
the brother’s full statement was undoubtedly helpful to the prosecution’s
case,401 to the extent that it was used as affirmative proof of the defendant’s
guilt, it was not helpful for the reasons Rule 106 was intended to be
helpful.402 It was used as a sword, to shoehorn inadmissible evidence into
the record, not a shield, to prevent a misunderstanding.403
If using Rule 106 to trump rules of evidence does very little to advance
the rule’s goals, then the benefit of allowing inadmissible evidence is very
small. This only makes the costs seem that much higher in comparison. By

399. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 335–36 and
accompanying text (discussing how the rule in LeFevour limited the use of remainders to
“pulling the sting” of misleading evidence).
400. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text. Lopez-Medina is an unusual
example because there is no clear evidentiary basis for admitting the half-brother’s plea in
the first place, which is why the prosecution objected initially. See supra note 257 and
accompanying text. One might argue that this entire case falls outside the scope of Rule 106
because the portion was not admissible, and thus its instructive value is limited. However,
this fear is unfounded, because it is possible to imagine an alternate fact pattern in which
Lopez-Ahumado’s statement that the drugs were his would be excepted from hearsay while
his statement incriminating his brother would not be. For example: Imagine LopezAhumado is speaking to a confidential informant who, unbeknownst to him, is wearing a
recording device. When the police arrive at Lopez-Ahumado’s home, he watches as they
approach the truck and confiscate the methamphetamine from inside of it. He turns to the
informant as this is happening, becomes agitated, and yells, “Those officers are taking my
drugs!” A few moments pass, Lopez-Ahumado calms himself, and the police have moved
away from the truck when Lopez-Ahumado says to the informant, “Looks like the police
took the drugs that belonged to me and my brother.” At trial, the defense seeks to enter the
first part of the statement as an excited utterance, and is successful because it is an exception
to hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); supra note 63 and accompanying text. When the
defense offers the first part at trial to argue once again that Lopez-Ahumado was the sole
possessor of the drugs, the remainder would not be excepted from hearsay if LopezAhumado were no longer excited or agitated when he said it, so the remainder could not
come in for the truth. The court would be left to decide whether the remainder, implicating
the brother, ought in fairness to be admitted under Rule 106. See supra Part I.D.4.
401. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
403. In this context, Nance’s criticism of LeFevour seems unfounded. See supra note 336.
Here, while it may have been tactically unwise for the defendant to enter his brother’s plea
into evidence, the consequence that his brother’s statement became affirmative evidence of
his guilt is too important to be explained away as a “risk” he had to “bear” when introducing
the statement. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 98. Here, merely using the
remainder to “pull[] the sting” is a fairer result. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977,
981 (7th Cir. 1986).
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allowing the jury to consider the factual allocution for its truth, that LopezAhumado actually did possess the drugs jointly with the defendant, the
admitted remainder gave the government an extra witness whose testimony
was never subject to cross-examination.404 This flies in the face of the
reasons behind the hearsay restriction405 for little benefit.
Or, to return to the hypothetical about the personal injury suit above,406 if
Rule 106 trumped the prohibition on hearsay, the plaintiff would be allowed
to offer the remainder as affirmative proof that three years prior the
defendant assaulted his brother. Even worse, if Rule 106 trumped Rule
404(b), the plaintiff’s attorney would be allowed to argue to the jury that
the defendant is more likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury because he
is a violent person. Rule 404(b) exists precisely to prevent these kinds of
arguments from being made.407
The only situation in which Rule 106 might need to trump a rule of
evidence to get the remainder admitted would be if the rule in question did
not allow evidence for “context” at all.408 But again, these rules likely
manifest a stronger preference than other rules for exclusion by delineating
particular exceptions or allowing no exceptions at all, and ought to be
respected rather than trumped by Rule 106.409

404. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 351–54 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. This problem is only compounded
when courts apply a fairness test that is broader than it probably should be. Under the Sutton
approach, in Haddad, the remainder to the effect of, “I didn’t know about the gun,” would be
admitted for its truth, rather than merely to clarify for the jury that the defendant had not
confessed to possessing everything under the bed. See supra notes 186–89 and
accompanying text. Absent a limiting instruction, the defense attorney could then argue that
statement as though the defendant said it in court. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
This would open a back door through the party opponent rule for remainders that probably
were not necessary in the first place. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text; supra
note 189.
408. See supra note 42.
409. See supra notes 42, 345 and accompanying text. United States v. West provides an
interesting example of what this might look like. United States v. West, 962 F.2d 1243 (7th
Cir. 1992). Although not a Rule 106 case, West implicates “completeness.” In a bank
robbery case, a court-appointed doctor examined the defendant to assist him in preparing an
insanity defense. Id. at 1244–45. The doctor found that, although the defendant had a
schizoaffective disorder on the day he robbed the bank, he still understood the wrongfulness
of the crime as he was committing it. Id. at 1245. Because not understanding the difference
between right and wrong is the standard for legal insanity, such a finding was inconsistent
with that defense. Id. However, the doctor’s conclusion that the defendant knew right from
wrong when he robbed the bank was inadmissible because Rule 704(b) bars an expert from
testifying as to whether the defendant was legally insane. Id. at 1246–47; see supra note 42.
The Seventh Circuit held that the doctor should have been allowed to testify, in support of
the insanity defense, that the defendant had the psychological disorder, but should have been
barred from testifying that the defendant knew right from wrong on the day of the crime. Id.
at 1250. The court conceded that this result made little sense, but found that the legislative
policy behind Rule 704(b) demanded it. Id. at 1248–49.
This case addresses a similar concern as Rule 106: if the doctor testified that the
defendant had a psychological disorder (this is like the portion), the jury might be misled
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C. Right on Rule 106, Wrong on Rainey:
The Other Two Approaches
This section will discuss the erroneous reasoning in both the most
restrictive approach to remainder admissibility and the moderate analysis in
LeFevour.
Courts that take the restrictive view and insist Rule 106 does not make
inadmissible hearsay admissible410 do not misunderstand Rule 106, but
often misunderstand Rainey. If a judge skips the fairness test and excludes
the remainder only because no hearsay exception applies,411 she has
ignored the fact that, if the remainder passes the fairness test, it will
automatically be admissible, not for the truth, but for context.412 On the
other hand, cases like McDarrah correctly recognize that remainders are
capable of a nonhearsay use.413 Thus, when courts claim that Rule 106
does not make inadmissible evidence admissible, they are correct, but fail to
recognize that a necessary remainder was never inadmissible in the first
place.
This understanding could have answered the Sixth Circuit’s concerns in
Adams.414 After determining that the government had unfairly presented
the recorded phone conversations in a way that changed their meaning,415
the trial court could have admitted any remainders necessary for the
purpose of clarifying that, when Maricle was asking questions about the
accusations leveled against him, he was not admitting to doing the things of
which he was accused.416 Thus, without revisiting the question of whether

into thinking the doctor concluded the defendant did not know right from wrong when he
committed the robbery, when in fact the doctor reached the exact opposite conclusion (the
remainder). See id. at 1246–47. The court in West was willing to reach what it found to be
an illogical result because Rule 704(b) clearly excluded the remainder without qualification.
See id. at 1247–50.
Under the same rationale, Rule 106 should not be interpreted to admit a remainder
that violates a strict exclusionary rule of evidence. One can imagine, for example, a
remainder concerning an alleged victim’s sexual behavior that, if offered during the
defendant’s case in chief, would be barred by Rule 412 unless it met one of the exceptions.
See supra note 42. The policy concerns underlying this strong prohibition should not change
just because the sexual behavior evidence is contained within a necessary remainder. See
supra note 43. If the portion without the remainder is so misleading as to be unduly
prejudicial, the entire statement may still be excluded under Rule 403. See supra note 334
and accompanying text.
410. See supra Part II.B.
411. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text. Because courts have misunderstood
the role of Rule 106, they have often applied the fairness test rather than applying the test in
Rainey. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text. But what they are actually skipping
is the Rainey test.
412. See supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 315–21 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 309–13 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 302–08 and accompanying text.
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Rule 106 trumps other rules, the Sixth Circuit could have given the
defendant his “redress.”417
The error in the LeFevour approach418 is subtler. This approach is
consistent with Rainey’s theory of remainder admissibility except where it
credits Rule 106 itself with making inadmissible evidence admissible for
the same kind of limited purpose.419 LeFevour420 was decided before
Rainey,421 so it is not surprising that Judge Posner found this power within
Rule 106 itself, and it does the same thing as Rainey without using the rule
directly.422 Nevertheless, it is sounder to base admissibility on relevance as
Rainey does because relevance is fundamental to admissibility,423 and
because it avoids suggesting that Rule 106 trumps other evidence rules.
D. A Complete Walkthrough: Handling a Rule 106 Objection
In a trial or other proceeding, when the proponent offers a portion of a
statement and the opponent objects under Rule 106, the judge should assess
the objection in several steps.
First, the judge should require the opponent to identify the parts of the
remainder that she would like to have admitted contemporaneously with the
proponent’s portion.424
Second, the judge should allow the proponent to object to the court
receiving the remainder or remainders at that time. If the proponent does
not object, the judge should admit the evidence without qualification.
Third, if the proponent objects, the judge should examine the remainder
or remainders that the opponent has offered. If the objection is to hearsay,
the judge should determine if there is any independent hearsay exception or
exemption under which it falls.425 Likewise, if the objection is not to
hearsay but rather to the original document rule, the judge should determine
whether any of the exceptions apply.426
If there is an applicable exception, the evidence is admissible, but the
court must still determine whether the evidence should be received
immediately or if it may be delayed until later in the trial. If it passes the
fairness test,427 the judge should admit the remainder or remainders under
the applicable exception and should not give the jury a limiting
instruction.428 If the evidence fails the fairness test, the judge should allow

417. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text.
418. See supra Part II.C.
419. See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text.
420. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986).
421. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
422. See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 14–15, 212–14 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
425. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803–804.
426. See FED. R. EVID. 1003–1004, 1007.
427. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
428. See FED. R. EVID. 105. Of course, if a limiting instruction would be required for any
other reason unrelated to this analysis, it should still be given.
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it to be admitted at an appropriate later time, because it is admissible but not
necessary to complete the portion at that time.429
In this step or in any other step, the judge should apply the fairness test as
follows: weigh whether the offered statements are necessary to (1) explain
the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, (3) avoid
misleading the trier of fact about what was said or meant, or (4) insure a fair
and impartial understanding.430 No remainders that (1) are irrelevant to the
issue of what was said or (2) go beyond explaining the portion pass this
test.431
If the objection is on any other grounds besides hearsay or the original
document rule, the judge should skip this third step.432
Fourth, if no hearsay or original document rule exception applies, or if
the proponent’s objection is based on a rule that excludes evidence for
specific impermissible purposes but allows it for any other purpose,433 the
judge should apply the fairness test434 to determine whether the remainder
may be offered at that time for “context.” If the remainder fails the fairness
test, the judge should not admit it at that time.
However, if the proponent objects on grounds that the remainder violates
a rule of evidence for which there are no exceptions435 or limited,
delineated exceptions,436 the judge should exclude the remainder.437 If the
portion without the remainder is then substantially more misleading than it
is probative, the judge should exclude the portion as well.438
Fifth, if the remainder passes the fairness test, the judge should consider
whether admitting it for the limited purpose of “context” would be
substantially more prejudicial than probative; that is, whether the jury is
likely to use the remainder for the impermissible purpose despite being
instructed otherwise, and how harmful that improper use would be.439 If
the objection is to hearsay, the judge should consider specifically whether
the jury is likely to use the remainder as affirmative proof of the truth of the
matter asserted, and whether that improper use would be harmful to the
proponent.440 If the remainder fails the Rule 403 balancing test,441 the
judge should exclude the remainder. If the portion without the remainder is

429. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
432. This is because other kinds of objections will likely require the court to determine
whether the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose, and the admission of such remainders
will turn on whether the remainder is correctly offered for “context.” See supra Part I.B.
433. See supra Part I.B.
434. See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text.
435. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
436. See, e.g., id. R. 412.
437. See supra notes 408–09 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 408–09.
439. See supra notes 16–17, 21–25 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 21–25, 100–06 and accompanying text.
441. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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then substantially more misleading than it is probative, the judge should
exclude the portion as well.442
Sixth, if the remainder passes the Rule 403 balancing test, the judge
should allow the opponent to offer it into evidence at that time. Upon
request, the judge should instruct the jury that it is not to consider this
evidence for whatever impermissible purpose that would have made it
inadmissible.443 If the remainder would be hearsay if offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, the judge should add the following instruction:
“[Proponent] presented the statement, [portion]. Then, [Opponent] offered
you the statement, [remainder]. This latter statement is admitted for only
one purpose: so that you may better understand what the first statement
actually meant.444 You may consider this latter statement to be true insofar
as it changes your understanding of what was meant by the first
statement.445 But you may not consider the latter statement as proof that
any fact it asserts on its own is actually true.”446
Since an otherwise inadmissible remainder becomes admissible for
context through Rules 401 and 402, and not Rule 106, failure to raise a
timely objection should not preclude remainders coming in for context or
any other permissible purpose later on in the case.447
If a remainder was admitted for context, then before closing arguments,
the judge should instruct the attorneys that they may not argue using the
remainder for any other purpose than that for which it was admitted.448 If
the remainder would have been hearsay but for limiting its purpose to
providing context, the judge should instruct the attorneys that they are not
to use any statement asserted in the remainder as affirmative proof, namely
that a fact is true because the declarant said so in the remainder.449
CONCLUSION
In an evidentiary system where the purpose for which evidence is offered
matters, having the correct interpretive framework for admissibility can
make a tremendous difference, even if in subtle ways. This is an area in
need of clarity and uniformity, both so that misleading statements are not
presented without correction, but also so the rule is not abused as a back
door to admit improper testimony, or proper testimony for improper
reasons.
Limiting the admissibility of remainders so that they achieve no more
than their proper purpose strikes the right balance. It preserves the policy

442. See id.
443. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 214, 226 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 371–77 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 371–77 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory
committee’s note.
448. FED. R. EVID. 105.
449. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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decisions inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence while still allowing
parties to correct misleading impressions. The methods described above
should help courts untangle a complex problem, and should ensure that no
more incriminating ghosts speak out from the witness stand in the name of
completeness.

